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Abstract
Deploying successful software-reliant systems that address
their mission goals and user needs within cost, resource, and
expected quality constraints require design trade-offs. These
trade-offs dictate how systems are structured and how they
behave and consequently can effectively be evolved and sus-
tained. Software engineering practices address this challenge
by centering system design and evolution around delivering
key quality attributes, such as security, privacy, data cen-
tricity, sustainability, and explainability. These concerns are
more urgent requirements for software-reliant systems that
also include AI components due to the uncertainty introduced
by data elements. Moreover, systems employed by the public
sector exhibit unique design time and runtime challenges due
to the regulatory nature of the domains. We assert that the
quality attributes of security, privacy, data centricity, sustain-
ability, and explainability pose new challenges to AI engi-
neering and will drive the success of AI-enabled systems in
the public sector. In this position paper, we enumerate with
examples from healthcare domain concerns related to these
requirements to mitigate barriers to architecting and fielding
AI-enabled systems in the public sector.
The exponential increases we have seen in computational
power and machine learning in the past decade have resulted
in huge investments in systems that aspire to exploit powers
of artificial intelligence (AI) andmachine learning (ML).We
can talk about the application of ML algorithms to models of
billions of parameters, and terabytes and petabytes of data.
Decision-making has a whole new meaning when driven by
these algorithms. However, irrational enthusiasm and confu-
sion are nothing new to the software engineering industry.
In time the disparity between hype and reality diminishes.
For example, we already better appreciate the centricity of
data to AI-enabled systems, which include not only software
and hardware components, but also AI algorithms, models,
and data. However, we are still in a quest to better understand
for which unique characteristics AI-enabled systems need to
be designed. Existing experience coming from industry and
research highlight that abstraction boundaries in system ele-
ments erode more quickly in AI-enabled systems, especially
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those containing an ML model (Sculley et al. 2015). Unan-
ticipated dependencies create attack surfaces for which the
system may not be secured. When the rate of evolution of
data, the trained model, and the deployed model are mis-
aligned, sustaining AI systems creates costly outcomes, in-
cluding but not limited to wrong inferences resulting in tak-
ing the systems out of production or creating unanticipated
user consequences.
These emergent design characteristics in AI systems are
exacerbatedwhen coupledwith the constraints of public sec-
tor systems. Barriers to deploying these systems in the pub-
lic sector include: not understanding how a decision is made,
no guarantee of security and privacy preservation, system
misalignment with unanticipated data changes, and the in-
troduction of new attack surfaces.
The robustness of AI-enabled systems will depend on how
the system guards against failures related to these ampli-
fied properties. AI systems are software systems. Decision
makers and developers of such systems in the public sector
need to embrace AI engineeringwhich accounts for building
reliable systems by integrating data and software elements
and uses design and analysis to manage the inherent uncer-
tainty posed by algorithms and other AI components. AI en-
gineering addresses challenges such as inability to specify
systems, managing hidden dependencies, and achieving ver-
ifiability with confidence. As more experience accumulates
in deploying such systems a top priority outcome will be
understanding what new architectural styles ensure the in-
tended behavior with describable quantification of risk.
For software systems deployed in the public sector, qual-
ity attributes are not just principles that make for a better,
more marketable product. They are the assurances required
for a regulatory agency to make enforcement determinations
about whether a software system complies with the legal and
regulatory requirements for the context in which it is de-
ployed. In this paper, we summarize unique characteristics
of security, privacy, data centricity, sustainability, and ex-
plainability as they relate to architecting AI-enabled systems
for the public sector. We drive our examples from healthcare
and specifically discuss AI-enabled Software as a Medical
Device (SaMD).
Quality Attributes and AI Engineering
Quality attributes in software systems are defined as a prop-
erty of a work product or goods by which its quality will be
judged by some stakeholder or stakeholders (ISO ). Qual-
ity attributes are and should be quantifiable in specifications
by the definition of some appropriate and practical scale
of measure (Clements et al. 2010). Software systems meet
their business and mission goals to the extend they meet
their quality attribute requirements. AI systems, in partic-
ular those with ML elements, are systems that learn from
data for decision making, hence are not designed to upfront
requirement specifications. However, this assertion applies
to the knowledge inference and modeling aspects. The over-
all quality concerns and expectations that should drive the
expected behavior and quality of AI systems do still follow
principles that can be known a priori, and evolved in con-
junction with the AI-enabled systems.
The practice of software engineering for systems that in-
corporate an AI component is at present an open research
topic. We identify four dimensions on which AI engineer-
ing most strongly needs to make immediate progress on:
building robust systems, data, human-machine interaction
andmodels. The quality attributes we highlight security, pri-
vacy, data centricity, sustainability and explainability illus-
trate how techniques for developing such systems as trust-
worthy robust software are required along these four dimen-
sions. We discuss these attributes individually and identify
cross-cutting concerns, particularly with respect to data.
Security
Securing AI-enabled systems amplifies the challenges asso-
ciated with securing software systems to a level we are ill-
equipped to address. AI systems have new attack surfaces.
The learning element of some AI algorithms can provide a
powerful vector for an attacker to change the output of a
system, and in a software system where AI is just one com-
ponent, the implications for the security of the system as a
whole can be difficult or impossible to model or test. Ad-
ditionally, the test space for an AI system explodes, when
we are considering a system designed to handle billions of
features (Breck et al. 2017).
AI-enabled systems frequently rely on abstracting the in-
put data into a data representation that is not human inter-
pretable. One particularly difficult problem in securing AI
systems is that the models and intermediate stages of an AI
system are not comprehensible by humans without machine
assistance. This makes fundamental aspects of verification
and validation not tractable for AI systems. These challenges
exist across many AI algorithms, but are particularly true of
deep learning models, where the model is a black box.
For public sector software systems, this frequent inability
to know that a system will perform as intended can create
barriers to deployment from regulatory, risk management,
and ethical perspectives. A software system that has substan-
tial legal or financial ramifications for users or consumers of
the products of that system ought to meet higher standards.
Securing AI systems requires new threat modeling of a
system which can also impact how the systems is designed.
The attack paths in these systems can be substantially more
complicated, since changes to the data can translate into
changes in the software system itself. Adversarial machine
learning attacks such as adversarial inputs and data poison-
ing rely on the adversary taking advantage of the openness of
the input space for an AI system. An approach like fuzzing
for testing cannot be used to ensure the security of these sys-
tems.
Privacy
Privacy in software relates to the ability of individuals to
have control and freedom of choice about the collection, use
and disclosure of information about themselves. It should be
clear to the users what information they are disclosing and
providing owners of the data its control. There are existing
guidelines and principles to help engineers understand pri-
vacy by design principles (Danezis et al. 2015).
Central AI concerns related to privacy include providing
control to the owners of the data about what is shared, ensur-
ing that derivative inferences are explained to the owners of
the data and the AI systems are designed with such bound-
aries in mind. Design approaches should center around de-
coupling collection of data from its analysis in addition to
mechanisms for securing.
Adversarial machine learning is implicated in privacy as
well. A model stealing attack seeks to reverse engineer a
model or its training data. This type of attack can expose
individuals information if it is contained within the train-
ing data. And even if the training data alone is not suffi-
cient to identify or deanonymize individuals, the potential
for deanonymization from combining data from multiple
sources is high (Benitez and Malin 2010).
Advances in AI and ML software have been built on large
volumes of data that have frequently been collected un-
der the auspices that the information contained within that
data can be anonymized. However, research has shown that
unicity and re-identifiability in large data collections is fre-
quently possible (Kondor et al. 2017). In the case of many
healthcare applications, the risk that unicity might exist in
a data collection is enough to dissuade the development of
applications, hindering research.
Data centricity
The role of data is the lynchpin aspect that makes engineer-
ing AI systems challenging, influencing every aspect of the
system design. Software elements need to be architected for
how data is structured, and how it behaves and need to be
explicitly architected with the uncertainty, availability, and
scalability of data in mind.
Most AI systems are centered around some ML model
that has been trained on some data which is the weakest
link. If the data presented to a trained model changes, then
the performance of the system may degrade. A model that is
designed to continuously learn from newly presented data is
very fragile to adversarial attack, since the results of a model
can be manipulated by presenting it with misleading or ad-
versarial data. A trainedmodel may produce results that can-
not be critically evaluated by an expert because the model
relies on patterns that are incomprehensible to the human
expert. In fact, this property of an AI system is exactly the
power of such a system. The interplay of a model, the data
on which it was trained, and the data on which it makes pre-
dictions is the source of many of the difficulties with fielding
trustworthy AI systems.
The scale of data poses its own set of engineering chal-
lenges. In the service of advancing AI techniques, entirely
new data storage and database architectures have been de-
veloped. The permissiveness of data typing means that en-
suring data quality can be a herculean task, which in turn
adds to the attack surface of such systems.
Sustainability
A key challenge in AI systems is the different rates of change
that may or may not be in sync with when the software that
contains the AI/ML components are deployed, evolved, and
replaced. A key principle of sustainability in AI systems is
that changing anything changes everything. At the heart of
these systems is a trained model. Even for algorithms that
can deliver deterministic output, if the observed data that is
presented to a model changes or the model is presented with
something novel, then the performance of that trained model
can decline substantially and unpredictably.
In the case of SaMD, sustainability includes striking a
balance between improving the quality of deployed systems
with maintaining the safety of such systems to be used in
a clinical setting. For example, incorporating improvements
to a model through continuous learning could improve an
AI-enabled SaMD, but before the improvements could be
pushed to the clinic, a series of tests would be required to re-
affirm the validity. Monitoring performance can create sub-
stantial overhead and burden on human users, since provid-
ing validation data can range from a time-consuming annoy-
ance in some domains to an impossibility in others.
The sustainability challenge for SaMD is determining the
pace at which to update the system. Retraining a model in
an AI/ML system can range in terms of disruption to the
system. And unlike a development cycle where updates to
the system are planned, developed and tested on an exter-
nal schedule, what triggers the need to refresh an AI system
cannot always be determined by user needs.
The FDA recognizes this quandary. The agency has previ-
ously approved AI-enabled systems that preclude changing
a deployed model while admitting that the power of these
AI/ML-based SaMD lies within the ability to continuously
learn. The agency feels comfortable fielding systems with
a recognizable sustainability model. At the same time, the
agency cannot resolve regulatory barriers to deploying more
innovative methods to the clinic because the risks of con-
tinuously evolving and deploying are unpredictable and it
would not be responsible to do so.
Explainability
The role of human machine teaming in AI systems is a
paramount concern. The trustworthiness of an AI system re-
lies on a users ability to understand how an algorithm has
arrived at a result. Constructing explainable systems is a fun-
damental research question of AI. One tension in engineer-
ing AI systems is AI systems enable analysis that cannot
be otherwise conducted, but these methods do not always
permit the analyst to trace what feature(s) resulted in a pre-
diction. When there are legal and ethical ramifications that
arise from this tension, the frequent answer is to block such
systems from being used in real scenarios.
In SaMD systems, explainability is a fundamental con-
cern of deploying such systems in the clinic. From the clin-
icians perspective, the software system providing some in-
sight into a diagnosis or treatment option must provide suffi-
cient information for her to feel confident that the treatment
option selected for the patient is the right one. From the pa-
tients perspective, he will not feel confident about the clin-
icians recommendation if she cannot provide a reasonable
explanation for why she chose a treatment option.
Developing techniques for explaining how outputs arise
from AI systems to allow for critical review by experts will
be a significant enabler to field these systems. Without such
techniques, the public sector will continue to lag behind
commercial capability fromAI systems due to an inability to
tolerate that level of risk. Designing a system such that infor-
mation about intermediate stages of a prediction are stored
and available to the user can be one way to aid in the explain-
ability problem. Some algorithms can provide a measure of
feature importance, which tells the user what features within
a dataset contributed to an output. Storing and presenting in-
termediate output may help a user understand what informa-
tion was used to arrive at a prediction. However, in the case
of deep learning algorithms, the problem of explainability
remains an evolving research area (Holzinger et al. 2018).
Role of Architecting in AI Engineering
An AI system must frequently be developed through the in-
terplay of experts from computer science, software engineer-
ing, data engineering, statistics, machine learning and some
other domain expertise. While teams of researchers have
been working to develop AI software systems across mul-
tiple disciplines, basic ambiguities arise from differences in
how experts communicate and understand the same prob-
lem. When you open the aperture to public sector soft-
ware projects, the communication and conceptual challenges
for understanding how AI systems interact with regulatory
frameworks that were not designed with software in mind,
much less AI-enabled software, the problem deepens. Gov-
ernment agencies are struggling to define how AI systems
integrate into current regulatory regimes. At the same time,
agencies are trying to determine the need for new regulatory
authority and guidance to manage harms from these systems.
The drive toward AI engineering practices informed by
quality attributes is fundamentally motivated by providing
the kind of trustworthy and predictable outcomes desired by
regulatory agencies. Additionally, regulatory agencies have
bodies of expertise in administrative law, regulatory process,
and subject matter expertise relevant to the regulated indus-
try, but not frequently in statistics, machine learning, com-
puter science or software engineering. These disciplines do
not communicate naturally with one another and the depth
of understanding in more than one domain required to effec-
tively regulate it is rare and difficult to obtain. The mo-
tive for the discussion above driving quality attributes is to
resolve this very tension inherent in fielding an AI system
from these multiple stakeholder perspectives in a safety criti-
cal environment whose performance cannot be proven. Soft-
ware architecture assists in this communication challenge
by modeling systems such that they can be analyzed from
multiple perspectives and for multiple purposes. Quality at-
tributes drive this process (Clements et al. 2010).
Security and privacy in AI systems are deeply enmeshed
in the data that is used in the system. Researchers from ev-
ery domain are seeking ways to leverage the power of AI al-
gorithms without exposing sensitive data. Ability to achieve
this also impacts the design of such systems, implying better
ways of decoupling algorithms and data, hence improving
ability to design for security, privacy, and sustainability. For
public sector software systems, the regulatory requirements
for handling, storing and sharing information are strict. As
a consequence, researchers‘ ability to even discover what an
AI application could do for many healthcare applications has
been hindered by the regulatory requirements.
Software architecture provides a mechanism for analyz-
ing dependencies to elucidate vulnerabilities and understand
the attack surface of a software system. For systems that
contain AI components, existing attack models may be in-
sufficient to expose the risks that arise from data centricity
and adversarial machine learning. For these complex sys-
tems that integrate AI components, new software architec-
ture principles and patterns will need to be developed to cap-
ture the new risks to the system from the AI components.
Abstraction and separation of concerns in software ele-
ments have been driving design and architecting principles
with an intend to aid in deploying secure and quality soft-
ware. The central role of data in AI systems challenges these
principles, substantially compromising security and privacy.
Our known architectural design tactics also do not suffice
to mitigate the risks either at an architectural or algorith-
mic level. Many of the privacy-preserving techniques that
have been proposed, such as homomorphic encryption have
proven too computationally expensive to implement in the
context of AI systems and remain the purview of mathemati-
cians and cryptographers.
Conclusion
FDA published a discussion paper on a regulatory frame-
work for AI/ML based software as a medical device that
raises some of the inherent barriers that exist for fielding AI
systems in safety critical environments. (FDA 2019). Specif-
ically, FDA notes that many of the AI technologies that have
been approved or cleared by FDA use of algorithms that are
locked, which the authors define as an algorithm that pro-
vides the same result each time the same input is applied and
does not change with use. Reading this definition in the con-
text of AI engineering implies that FDA feels comfortable
deploying an AI-enabled system provided that it is determin-
istic enough to fit within the software assurance frameworks
of conventional software engineering.
This compromised approach that FDA suggests coupled
with a disciplined focus on design and runtime attributes of
AI-enabled systems as we discussed in this position paper
offers a way ahead for the public sector while research and
practices catches up. Repeatable practice will emerge as we
understand more and create consistent vocabulary around
expressing and analyzing for related design concerns.
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